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FOREWORD
North Korea's nuclear program is the greatest current threat
to U.S. and Northeast Asian security. The outcome of negotiations
over this program will have a tremendous impact on the future of
the Korean peninsula and on the vital interests of the United
States and neighboring states to North and South Korea: China,
Japan, and Russia. Bearing this in mind, the Center for Strategic
and International Studies convened a conference on June 28-29,
1994, to consider the crisis surrounding North Korea's nuclear
program in its international context. Experts spoke about the
program and its impact on the two Koreas and on the neighboring
states. Professor Stephen Blank presented this paper on Russian
policy with regard to Korea.
Dr. Blank relates Moscow's position on the issues of North
Korean nuclearization to the broader domestic debate in Russia
over security policy, in general, and Asian policy, in
particular. He contends that Russia's policy is a function of
that broader debate and must be understood in that context. The
Strategic Studies Institute is publishing the paper as a
contribution to the understanding of the current Korean crisis
and of Russian security policy, particularly in Asia, but also in
the context of its overall formulation.
JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The crisis ignited by North Korea's nuclear program affects
Russia's vital interests. To understand Russian policy in this
crisis, we must refer to both those vital geopolitical interests
and to the contemporary and bitter domestic debate over Russian
policy abroad.
In strategic terms, Russia has fought three wars in or
around Korea in this century and a peaceful Korea is an essential
aspect of Russian Asian policy. Russia also is determined to
remind the world that its vital interests in Asia must not be
ignored. It fears the breakdown of the nonproliferation regime
and also regards friendship with South Korea as an essential
aspect of its Asian policy. Therefore its interests point to
support for nonproliferation by the North.
However, Russian objectives go far beyond this. Russia is
still stalemated in its relations with Japan and cooperation over
Korea between the two states is unlikely given their very
disparate interests. Thus, prospects for Russia's proposed 10
power conference (including both Koreas, the five members of the
Security Council, Japan, the UN, and International Atomic Energy
Agency) are doubtful since a breakdown between at least these two
members is likely to occur quite soon. In addition, Russian
foreign policy is now a "victim" of the bitter domestic struggle
that characterizes Russian politics. The government does not
speak with a single voice due to this struggle and it has had to
make numerous concessions to the partisans of a rather
militarized policy perspective toward Asia.
This line of thought is now ascendant in Russian policy. If
one examines Russian policy in detail one finds an unwillingness
to accept that North Korea has nuclear weapons or may have them
soon, a military unconcern over that fact except for its impact
on Japanese and South Korean defense planning, and a desire to
regain leverage over North Korean policy to replace what was lost
by Russia's unilateral renunciation of its 1961 treaty with North
Korea. There is very clearly a right-wing bloc of support in the
Parliament and in the military-industrial complex (MIC) for
resuming ties with the North Koreans in the belief that Russia
can then sell them arms and resume profitable economic exchanges.
Thus the military press alleges that the whole crisis has been
"cooked up" by Washington and Pyongyang for domestic purposes.
These groups also want Russia to come close to China's
position which consistently has been more solicitous of North
Korea's interests and perceptions than President Yeltsin's and
Foreign Minister Kozyrev's have been. The MIC also seeks to usurp
control of foreign policy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and to push a line at the conference whose aim is the retreat of
American military power from the North Pacific and South Korea.
It is very unlikely that these objectives either comport with
U.S. goals or those of South Korea. Certainly they do not

harmonize with Japanese interests. The Russian conference
proposal and its suggested agenda of neutralizing Korea and
denuclearizing the surrounding North Pacific area evoke old
objectives dating back to Brezhnev and reflect a primarily
military orientation to the regional security agenda.
An equally important goal of the Russian proposal is that it
lead the way to a general acceptance of the importance Russia has
for the region, even though it can barely compete there now and
has lost much of the goodwill Gorbachev won for it. Certainly
there is a considerable disillusionment with Russia in South
Korea, especially among business and economic institutions. This
proposed conference is seen as a way to recoup Russia's
diminished standing in Asia and prove it is still important
there. This leads the Russian government to advance long-standing
proposals whose relevance to the problem at hand is questionable
and whose main purpose is to scale down American power and
presence in Asia. For all these reasons the Russian proposal is
not particularly helpful or useful to the United States. Indeed,
Russian policy represents a significant backtracking from the
1991-93 period when Yeltsin pushed forward the rapprochement with
the South and repudiated past arrangements with the North. The
pressure to sell arms to both North and South or use arms to
reduce the debt to the South indicates the degree to which Russia
has failed to advance a nonmilitary agenda in Asia or contribute
to Asian security.
Finally, Russia's policy position here reflects the
difficulty involved in trying to build Asian security systems
above diverse regional subsystems and establish a viable arms
control regime at a time when individual states like Russia,
China, and Japan, tend to go their own way on this and other
issues. In this sense Russia's position on Korean nuclearization
and ultimately on the destiny of the two states on the Korean
peninsula reflects a deeper Asian tendency. Russian policy on
Korea shows us how difficult it will be to construct a Russia
that can contribute to Asian security and stability and an Asia
that can welcome a reformed Russia into its midst.

RUSSIAN POLICY AND THE KOREAN CRISIS
To understand Russian policies and objectives in the current
Korean crisis we must refer to both Russian geopolitical
imperatives and to the domestic factors impinging upon today's
Russian foreign policy process. It is relatively easy to describe
the geopolitical factors. In this century, Russian forces have
thrice fought in or for Korea. Today a tranquil, nonnuclear Korea
is as vital, if not more vital, than before. Peaceful political
settlement of outstanding issues on the Korean Peninsula allows
Russia to conduct its traumatic economic and political
reconstruction in a peaceful Asia without diverting funds that it
does not have to military spending. In Korea's case, peaceful
political settlement also lets Russia improve relations with
South Korea, which is fast becoming its valued regional partner.
This partnership is particularly important to Russia's Far
Eastern or Maritime Provinces and to Siberia. That friendship, as
a recent Russian-South Korean summit in Moscow confirmed, is
vital to Russia because it also gives Seoul reason to see Russia
as a necessary interlocutor on Korean issues.1
Securing this foreign estimate, that Russia is objectively a
leading player in Asia, is the fundamental political objective of
Russia's current Asian policy.2 It is only by addressing military
and political issues through friendship with South Korea that
Russia can achieve this status because it is virtually incapable
of serious military action in Asia and its economy and trade are
not commensurate with its potential there.
Friendship with South Korea also enables Russia to check
North Korean behavior. President Yeltsin and other policymakers
have already denounced the 1961 treaty with the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), stated that they would not
renew it, and that they now understand it to mean that they would
only support the DPRK against an unprovoked attack, a most
unlikely scenario.3 Since its unilateral renunciation of this
treaty in 1991-92, Moscow has forfeited its former leverage on
the North. Today it can only exercise an indirect leverage on
Pyongyang through this friendship, though it clearly now seeks to
redress that balance.
Russia uses friendship with South Korea to show Japan what
it loses by not normalizing relations with Russia and that Russia
does not need Japan. This is probably a very shortsighted view,
but nonetheless it is current in policymaking circles.4 In
addition, by all accounts, Russia and China see eye to eye on
major Asian security issues, Korea among them.5 One of those
points is a good working relationship with South Korea precisely
because it offers increasing economic benefits to both states.
Sino-Russian accord also restrains North Korea from dragging them
into a crisis to save itself or from playing them off against the
other, a habitual DPRK tactic.
Lastly there is the geopolitical issue of nonproliferation.

Countless Russian spokesmen reiterate that they regard this
specter as a major and not so distant threat, especially to
Russia's Muslim South. For example, if North Korea provided Iran
with nuclear weapons, that would substantially aggravate the
region's already volatile conditions. Also, if the North already
has a nuclear capability, it could conceivably (although the
prospect is remote) use it against Russia, or if it is used
elsewhere, Russia could be severely affected by the fallout. If
U.S. intelligence reports about the Nodong missile system are
true, North Korea may be on its way to an IRBM capability that
could also conceivably target Russian assets.6
For these reasons, and because there has long been little
love lost between Moscow and Pyongyang, a consensus exists that
the Korean Peninsula should solve its political problems and
approach ultimate unification through negotiation; that Russia
should use this opportunity to promote its own standing in Asia
through President Yeltsin's proposed 10 power conference (both
Koreas, the five members of the Security Council, Japan, the UN,
and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]); and that
North Korean proliferation poses risks to Russia.7 Moreover,
there is the desire to prevent a war from breaking out there in
order to maintain close harmony and even alliance (Foreign
Minister Kozyrev's word) with China and promote the burgeoning
ties with South Korea. More to the point, Russia fears that war
might force it to take a stand or commit itself to intensified
military activity, two thoroughly unpalatable options. However,
it is not likely this conference will take place since all of the
other participants reject the idea.
The Russian Policy Process.
However, this consensus and seemingly benevolent posture in
the crisis is hardly the whole story. To believe that this
represents the sum total of Russian regional objectives would be
misleading. While Yeltsin supports unification through peaceful
means, and that North Korea open itself up to IAEA inspection,
Russian policy is more conflicted than this effort to safeguard
traditional Russian interests would indicate.
For example, Russian policy towards Japan is stalemated in
an adamant refusal to negotiate the status of the Kurile Islands,
the precondition for normalizing Russo-Japanese relations. On May
28, 1994, Izvestiia reported that there are no politicians in
Yeltsin's entourage, beginning with Premier Chernomyrdin, who are
ready to fulfill the provisions of the 1956 treaty with Japan
that called for renouncing the two southernmost islands. Japan
stubbornly rejects Russia's inclusion in the G-7 and ex-Foreign
Minister Watanabe has confessed that he does not understand what
happens in Russian policy from week to week. Meanwhile, "The top
Moscow leadership has lost interest in political talks with
Japan. The level of diplomacy has fallen to that of Poland."8

For the Korean crisis this situation means that Russia and
Japan have little or nothing to say to each other. This also was
the conclusion of a National Defense University politicalmilitary simulation of 1992 where the author led the Russian
team. The Russian and Japanese teams, in discussing their actions
in the event of a nonnuclear crisis, found that neither side had
much to say to the other. In practical terms this means that the
projected 10 power conference almost certainly guarantees a
stalemate from the start, especially as Russia intends for it to
become the vehicle for a broader effort to achieve collective
security for Asia. Thus the conference would not be confined to
the nuclear issues or even just Korean security, but would be the
basis for legitimating Russia as one of those with a droit de
regard for all Asia.9 If Russia cannot compose its relations with
Japan or deal with them seriously, there is little prospect that
its initiative could truly resolve the outstanding issues in the
Korean Peninsula or broader regional security. While this
stalemate in Russo-Japanese relations is equally due to Japan's
long-term political crisis, inflexibility, and timid diplomacy,
it also owes much to the problems affecting Russian foreign
policymaking in general and Asian policy in particular.
As Suzanne Crow recently wrote, the domestic conflicts over
Russia's general foreign policymaking relate to both procedural
and substantive issues that have made foreign policy a "victim"
of domestic politics.10 Foreign policymaking is characterized by
the following aspects of policy strife:
• No standard procedure or institutional basis for
formulating foreign policy exists as yet. Since there is no
institutional hierarchy, all players: rival ministries, the
Security Council, legislature, the president's and the premier's
personal administrations can expect to express their views and
have them heeded even if they are voiced out of turn and
context.11
• Confusion over foreign policy decisionmaking also resides
in the struggle between the executive and the legislature. Not
only is the executive internally divided, there also is
substantive inter-branch discord on the fundamental rules of the
game. Because there is frankly no rule of law, this absence of
legal constraint creates a free-for-all. Any player can attack
anyone else in the struggle for foreign, defense, or overall
security policy. This struggle also characterizes the issue of
arms sales, which is also a free-for-all among rival and poorly
controlled institutions which show no hesitation in flouting the
law. Thus, Russia is trying vainly to sell South Korea arms in
return for debt that it cannot repay, even as its elites openly
talk of resuming arms sales to the DPRK.12
• Foreign policymaking is further complicated by the intense
deep-seated discord in Russian society and among elites over what
general and specific regional policies should be. All accounts of
late Soviet and Russian Asian policy concede that intense

battles, including ones over Korean issues, took place, and still
occur.13 The vocal debates over fundamental issues betray a
society and state that have lost an empire and not yet found a
role or ideology appropriate to their new circumstances. This
"shouting" makes for an uncertain, even confused policy abroad.14
This conflict in policymaking cannot be explained, according to
Crow, by the bureaucratic method beloved of U.S. analysts and
policymakers. As she rightly points out, because there is no true
rule of law, the ground rules for such conflicts that postulate
bureaucratic and inter-branch interaction do not exist. Second,
the debaters over foreign policy are not necessarily or
exclusively guided by institutional interests, such as increasing
a ministry's turf and budget. Rather there are fundamental
ideological cleavages over national identity and interest.15
• Another factor making the nature of Russian policy
uncertain is Yeltsin's habit of personally taking a line that
does not coincide with his ministries or that they are actually
unaware of. The flaps over bases abroad and over NATO membership
for Poland, as well as the cancellation of two trips to Japan,
all show a president ready to intervene in foreign policy on
behalf of his own opinions and perceptions. As Crow observes,
"Some of Russia's diplomatic moves have conveyed the impression
that Yeltsin is very much in charge of Russian foreign policy and
feels unfettered by his advisers and bureaucracy in Moscow."16
This sense of being unfettered is both cause and effect of the
absence of the rule of law and the resort to quasi-constitutional
and quasi-Tsarist modes of government reminiscent of the late
Tsarist period, especially 1905-17.17 Though Yeltsin has
periodically decreed supposedly legal regulations upon the
confusion in the policy process, the decrees paradoxically
promoted this confusion and inter- institutional rivalry.18
Russia's Policy Process and Asian Policy.
This excursion into the basis for Russian policymaking is
essential to understand Russian policy and objectives in the
current Korean crisis. Behind the support for a 10 power
conference, peaceful reunification of North and South Korea,
renunciation of the 1961 treaty, friendship with South Korea, and
compliance with the IAEA's inspection requirements, a tough
domestic struggle is going on over fundamental and secondary
issues of Asian policy. Elsewhere I characterized this struggle
as being one of rivalry between two basically incompatible
viewpoints, a militarizing or military viewpoint and a second,
economic one.19
Russia's real problem in Asia is choosing between these
fundamental and incompatible approaches. The militarizing
viewpoint's adherents manifest a truculent disdain for Japan and
civilian authority back home. For example, Russian Defense
Minister Grachev and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) have
frequently asserted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

cannot play the role of leader of Russian foreign policy. Instead
that role should belong to or be usurped by them. Asked about
possibly expanding ROK-Russian military cooperation, in 1993,
Grachev boldly replied,
"I am willing to exchange opinions and cooperate with
all Asian countries and their military leaders on all
issues falling under the jurisdiction of our business."
He went on to say he believed that, even in those
instances in which politicians and diplomats were at a
loss to solve problems between two countries, soldiers
were capable of finding common ground within the
framework of military cooperation between the two.20
Similarly, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, First Deputy CINC of
Russia's navy, stated in Vladivostok that nuclear dumping would
continue in the Sea of Japan's enclosed waters, only 200 miles
from Japan. Although Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin had
banned it, the dumping would continue because Kasatonov was
"confident that Chernomyrdin's veto is a purely political move
designed to please Japan and that the government will soon give
permission for another dumping of radioactive waste."21
Kasatonov's statement came as a "complete surprise" to Foreign
Ministry officials.22 His confidence in defying and dismissing
his government's policy illustrates a fundamental structural
crisis of Russian security policy. As Pavel Felgengauer, the
respected defense correspondent of Segodnya, told a U.S.-Russian
conference in California in November 1993, the armed forces may
be under commanders' operational control; but commanders,
officers, and troops are by no means under the government's
strategic command and control.23 Although much of the concern
about this phenomenon has focused on Europe or the Caucasus, it
is no less important in Asia. Kasatonov's remarks also indicate
the armed forces' continuing intervention in politics.
Throughout 1992-93 the armed forces successfully and
publicly intervened in the discussion over the Southern Kurile
Islands. They mobilized parliamentary and public opinion against
concessions to Japan, using arguments that, if analyzed
carefully, are strategically questionable.24 This intervention
helped torpedo two proposed Yeltsin visits to Japan and limited
opportunities for serious discussions when he finally went. Yet
these intrusions went unpunished. Thereby encouraged, the
military hard-liners continue undermining civilian authority and
official diplomacy while conducting their own truculent and
provocative anti-Japan policy.25 Some civilian analysts charge
that Kasatonov deliberately aimed to upstage the government.26
Kasatonov's insubordination and his arrogant disdain for
civilian authority showed a blunt disregard for the broader
implications of his actions for national interests and continued
the tradition of casting Russia's Far East interests primarily in
military terms. Traditionally, the military view has been that
the region is constantly threatened by enemies, particularly by

the United States, Japan, and China. In addition, the military
has adopted a visibly racist attitude toward Japan and China.
Today Japanese concerns are regarded with a combination of fear
and (visibly) arrogant disdain, while the Far Eastern region is
seen basically through the prism of potential military scenarios.
Therefore, the adherents of the militarizing view currently also
strongly support an alliance with China and spurn agreement with
Japan over the Kurile Islands. They also have a unique slant on
North Korea's missiles and proliferation threat.
Advocates of the second, economic, approach to Asia, on the
other hand, see regional integration and joint cooperation as
Russia's fundamental Asian-Pacific objective. They recognize,
that (1) the Far East, in Chernomyrdin's words, is the "gateway"
to the Asian, if not world, economies, (2) to join these
economies, Russia must reconcile with Japan, and (3) failure to
join spells disaster for Russia. Far from deliberately provoking
Japan, they seek to resolve outstanding disputes and lessen
mutual suspicions in both sides' interests. They do not view the
Asia Pacific Region (APR) in zero-sum terms of warfare or of
"ontological" enemies. Instead, economic integration in Asia
benefits everyone. Almost every civilian analyst understands that
the economic development of Siberia, the Maritime Provinces, and
Russian Asia in general is the precondition for any effective
Russian role in Asia's economy and politics. Otherwise Russia
will not be taken seriously in Asia.27 Therefore Russian
statesmen should devise appropriate policies and institutions to
facilitate economic development and international integration. A
1991 Soviet study, the Russia Far Eastern Economic Yearbook,
reflected this continuing stress on ties to Japan, and the
broader vision of a cooperative multilateralism in Northeast Asia
that includes both Koreas. The authors wrote,
In this connection a special role of Japan in the
economic development of the Far East should be
mentioned. Under the conditions of the Soviet policy
alteration Japan, with its powerful industrial,
technological, and financial potential, as it seems,
should play the leading part in the development of
multilateral cooperation. First of all it means setting
up of the economic zone `Sea of Japan' in the
North-East of Asia which could involve the economy of
the Soviet Far East, the North-East of China, People's
Democratic Republic of Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and
other interested countries. Realization of this project
will contribute to the development of not only
bilateral but also trilateral and multilateral
cooperation, it will give a new impetus to the
development of the Soviet-Japanese economic ties.28
This divergence between the economic and militarizing
approaches to Asia thus finds expression in tangible policy
differences on Korean issues. While both sides agree that nuclear
proliferation in North Korea is a serious affair having

repercussions for Russia should a war or more intense crisis
develop, Russian generals discount Pyongyang's possession of
nuclear weapons as having little serious strategic significance
for Russia or for regional strategic and military balances.
Therefore they do not take that threat too seriously.29 Krasnaia
Zvezda, the MOD's newspaper, cited Russia's Foreign Intelligence
Service in stating that there was serious reason to doubt a North
Korean "breakthrough" to produce nuclear weapons. The article's
author concluded that Pyongyang "cooked up" the nuclear question
to continue mobilizing the population while Washington did so to
combat communism. However, the lack of clarity on the issue could
lead other Asian states, particularly Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan, to follow suit and go nuclear.30
Obviously the military's main concern is a nuclear Japan,
either within the umbrella of the U.S. security treaty or, if
that breaks down, on its own. Then they fear that Japan would
probably go nuclear or come under great pressure to do so.31
Although preventing a nuclear arms race in Asia is a shared goal,
the view that the current crisis is "cooked up" solely for
political reasons represents the military's suspicion of the
United States and Japan. They also oppose pressing Pyongyang too
hard with sanctions. Rather, they maintain that on this issue it
is more important to come close to China's position.32 There also
are elements within the government and among those favoring arms
sales as a policy aiming to save Russia's defense industries that
renewed sales, even if only of spares, to Pyongyang would regain
leverage lost by Russia's unilateral renunciation of the treaty
in 1992.33 Because Russian help played a large role, a decade
ago, in North Korea's buildup and nuclear program, arms sales
could have dangerous consequences.
The author of the Zvezda article also opined that this
crisis provides an opportunity to launch an Asian version of the
Helsinki Conference. Russia would naturally then be invited to
play a leading role in determining any outcome to the Korean
crisis.34 These are old, one-sided proposals to leverage Russia's
military power so Russia will be taken seriously in Asia and to
constrain U.S. and Japanese policies. At recent Russo-Japanese
military meetings to create confidence- building measures,
Russia's delegation called for a CSCE and CBM process like
Europe's. Furthermore, Major General Anatoly Lukyanov stated that
Russia wanted multilateral collective security everywhere.35
Everything that has been written on Soviet and now Russian
proposals along these lines indicates that these proposals, going
back to Brezhnev's, aim at including Russia in Asian affairs and
thereby diminishing the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances in
favor of some amorphous collective security system.36 Rather than
build Asian security from below as many have argued, Russia
continues to push the same one-sided visibly anti-Japanese and
anti-American proposals. That these proposals are targeted
against the U.S.-Japanese alliance is obvious from the statement
by V.N. Bunin of the Academy of Sciences, holding that the
U.S.-Japanese alliance must no longer be directed against any

countries in the region.37 But calling for such processes also
implies disregarding other states' security, particularly
Japan's. Thus the Russian military delegation to Tokyo apparently
avoided discussing Japan's primary security concern, North Korean
nuclear proliferation.38
These proposals are clearly designed to win the armed
forces' support as is also signified by placing General Lukyanov
at the head of Russia's delegation to Tokyo. Moreover, despite
the search for a way to avoid regional nuclearization, Russian
authors admit they do not know how to avert conventional arms
proliferation, which is much more imminent a threat to the ROK,
other than by the model of the Sino-Russian alliance. That is
hardly applicable to the Korean Peninsula. And, in making this
admission, they also admit that worst-case scenario planning for
military contingencies in Asia continues. Major General A.V.
Bolyatko (Ret.) states,
The question of downsizing armed forces and
conventional armaments in Northeast Asia can prove to
be fairly difficult, which is due to the complex
strategic and military-political situation in the
region. This is shown by the Soviet-Chinese
negotiations and subsequently the Russian-Chinese
negotiations on reducing armed forces in the border
area, as well as by the indepth analysis of the problem
of territorial division with Japan conducted by Russian
military specialists. It was based on a worst case
scenario for Russia, in the event of a large-scale
conventional war in the Far East, taken out of the
context of the military and political changes in the
world, the agreements between Russia and the United
States and the level of trust achieved by now. It
envisions an all round defense and complete coverage of
the Sea of Okhotsk and the adjacent territory from
massed enemy attacks.
In our opinion, another approach is more reasonable
whereby the resolution in the Kuril and South Sakhalin
zones should be ensured on a trilateral basis by
cutting not only Russian and Japanese zones but also
U.S. zones.39
Russia's call for a CSCE type system disregards the efforts
of Asian states. It seeks to pre-define for them the parameters
of security, showing little grasp of what Russia must do to fully
participate in Asian security. Moreover, what really is intended
here is that Japan be deprived of its security anchor while
ignoring its concerns. This is not a viable basis for either
enhancing Asian security or Russian integration into it. Were
these goals to be achieved by Russia's initiative, they would
also entail the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, probably
under conditions of a guaranteed unification process over time,
denuclearization, and likely neutralization of all of Korea. It

is by no means certain that this is in U.S. interests since this
unified Korea, whether neutral or not, would then have to
maneuver on its own between three powers whom it distrusts and
who distrust it: Japan, China, Russia.
Therefore, Korea's crisis offers military grounds for Russia
to float obsolete and long-rejected initiatives to join Asia's
security agenda. These proposals, either advanced or implicit in
the militarizing approach, reflect Russia's continuing inability
to play an active nonmilitary role in Asia, its hostility towards
U.S.-Japanese policies, and also the fear that Russia might even
be shut out of the defense and security agenda on its own
borders. As noted above, many elites also still decry the loss of
contacts with Pyongyang and wish to sell arms there, ostensibly
to regain an audience and some leverage.
For the civilian adherents of the economic approach,
proliferation in and of itself and any further nuclearization of
Asia constitute a threat to Russia regardless of their origin.
Russia's Ambassador to Seoul, Georgii F. Kunadze, stated that
Russia's principled position is absolute objection to the
presence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula (this also
includes U.S. systems whose absence obviously enhances Russian
security).40 These figures view North Korea's gambit and the
world's response not as a bluff but as a serious potential crisis
with dangerous regional implications. For example, Vadim
Makarenko wrote that Russia cannot remain impartial about Chinese
nuclear testing because of the danger of an arms race and nuclear
proliferation.
For Russia, moreover, with its sparsely populated
Siberia and Far East, and its sharply decreasing
capacities for maintaining large conventional armed
forces, guarantees of nuclear security are becoming
vitally necessary. This makes Russia extremely
interested in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
in the world.41
Unfortunately, it appears that the logic and adherents of
the militarizing approach to Asia have won the struggle for now.
Accordingly Yeltsin's proposed conference must be interpreted in
the light of their objectives and interests. Obviously the main
objective of those directing Asian and Korean policy is still
collective security in Asia with a program for a denuclearization
of Korea (and Japan), unified by an acceptable peaceful process,
and the probably phased recession of American military power from
Korea. Japan would be isolated. Meanwhile, Russia, which still
cannot participate in Asia on an equal basis or one commensurate
to its potential, would enjoy a disproportionate role as a
guardian of this order that has a veto over other states while it
eludes that control. This is because a collective security
system, as is well known, cannot ensure either collectivity or
security to its members or stop any single member from flouting
its conventions and rules.42

The 10 Power Conference and Russian Korean Policy.
For these reasons Russia's proposed 10 power conference and
its policy on the Korean peninsula is more multifaceted than
might otherwise appear to be the case. Actually it is shrouded in
ambiguities and conflicts. Russian officials cannot even agree
whether or not North Korea presently has a viable nuclear bomb.
That is not an academic question, since those contending that the
North currently lacks the capability obviously have a more benign
view of the DPRK's capabilities and objectives, a softer spot for
it, and less belief in the current crisis' urgency. Among those
so arguing is Chief of Staff, Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov.
Replying to charges published in Japan, and based on classified
General Staff documents that Russia actively helped the North
build nuclear systems a decade ago, and that Russian scientists
are currently working in the North, he called the charges about
past policy nonsense. He added the assertion,
That Pyongyang has one or two nuclear warheads and that
several more will come off its assembly lines by the
end of the year is sheer nonsense. I can say with full
authority that the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea has none of these things. Just as it does not
have any such mythical missiles as the Rodong-1 and
Rodong-2 [Nodong-1 and Nodong-2] or several hundred
other nuclear warhead delivery vehicles.43
More recently, the scientist who allegedly designed the
DPRK's nuclear reactor, Vladislav Kotlov, a top Russian scientist
in the Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering, said the whole
crisis was merely a procedural one revolving around the IAEA's
inspection regime. Japan and South Korea were only trying to stir
unrest and create a "scandal" with U.S. backing. On the same day
Foreign Minister Kozyrev also questioned whether the North had
already developed a weapon. While it probably could do so in the
future, he was not sure about now. In any event Russia and the
United States were now constructively coordinating their actions
on the issue.44 On the other hand, on February 14, 1994, two
weeks after Japanese newspapers published the charges that
Kolesnikov sought to refute, Vladimir Kumachev, an advisor to the
Director of Russia's Institute of National Security and Strategic
Research, claimed that North Korea had both nuclear weapons and
delivery vehicles for them. Also, as early as 1985, Moscow became
aware of the North's nuclear ambitions, leading Moscow to
withdraw most of its specialists from there.45 More recently a
February 1990 document, allegedly written by then head of the KGB
Vladimir Kryuchkov, reportedly concluded, based on reliable
sources, that the North did indeed already have a suitable
nuclear weapon that it planned to hide from the world. The report
also stated that North Korea's leadership was determined "to gain
military superiority over South Korea" and join the ranks of
nuclear states.46 Thus it is unclear how urgently Moscow or

Russia's elite circles view the threat or danger (the two are not
the same in Russian parlance) of nuclear proliferation or
imminent conflict in Korea. And it is equally unclear how serious
are Moscow's protestations of good faith and unconcern that an
imminent nonproliferation or military crisis is at hand.
Clearly, Kolesnikov speaks for a large part of the military
and of the overall policy community.47 And this fact, given the
possibility of deliberate deception, casts a grave light over any
Russian proposals. Thus, at the Russo-Japanese-U.S. talks cited
above, Russia's delegation stated that Japan's concerns about
nuclear proliferation were misplaced. Russia believed that
existing nuclear potential is not the same thing as a nuclear
capacity.
It follows, therefore, that the DPRK must not be
allowed to feel that its security is compromised at
all. A policy of pressuring North Korea and creating a
vacuum around it can only have the opposite effect, and
incite it to accelerate the creation of nuclear
weapons. What is needed is dialogue with Pyongyang. And
the way is clear. Not without the participation of
Russian diplomacy, it was decided to place seven North
Korean facilities under IAEA supervision. (Emphasis by
the author)48
Kolesnikov's views are not only shared by many members of
Russia's elite, they apparently are also those of China, or at
least his counterparts there, Chief of Staff Zhang Wannian and
Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Council of the PRC Liu
Hunaqin (Deng Xiaoping's man in the PLA). After visiting China in
April 1994, Kolesnikov stated that their views were quite close
in that they categorically are against any proliferation of
nuclear technologies. But the problem in Northeast Asia is
complicated by the fact that while the North does have a "tough
and inflexible stand"; it is being subjected to "unfairly tough
pressure" from the UN and IAEA.49
That support for Kolesnikov's views exists throughout much
of Russia's policy community is also incontestable. Deputy
Foreign Minister Panov, former Ambassador to Seoul, denied that
the North has a nuclear capability. Moreover, the crisis should
be resolved, not by coercive or compulsory measures like
sanctions, but by the Russian proposed conference.50 Ivan Rybkin,
Speaker of the Lower House of the Duma, told the DPRK's
ambassador in Moscow that "Russia's new policy is based on the
premise that finding new friends does not mean losing old
chums."51 In May 1994, Panov also told ITAR-TASS that both Russia
and the DPRK favor boosting bilateral links, including political
contacts. North Korea also advocates Russia's participation in
the Rajin-Sonborg free economic zone and cooperation in Siberia
and the Far East. North Korea also told him "quite firmly" that
it welcomed Russia's initiative for an international conference
and is studying it.52 While that does not mean acceptance, it is

a sign of something more than the outright refusal to accept
Russian mediation that had previously been the case.53 And with
that sign of mellowing attitudes came Izvestiya's report that
Russia fears U.S. proposals for sanctions because Russia, who
trades with the DPRK, would have to pay for them. In addition,
diplomats maintain it is necessary to have a balanced
relationship with both Koreas to correct the tilt to Seoul that
had emerged.54 Similarly MOD circles now do not rule out the
possibility of supplying the North Korean Army with spare parts
in order to obtain additional levers for influencing the DPRK's
leaders.55 Finally, Moscow Radio, broadcasting in Korean, favored
the North's demand that Washington negotiate a peace treaty with
it to replace the 1953 Panmunjom armistice. The broadcast
observed that any conflict in Korea "would not be limited to the
Korean peninsula as it was not some 50 years ago."56
These feelers indicate mostly Moscow's effort to play the
role of mediator between both Koreas and demonstrate that it is a
real player in Asia. They do not necessarily betoken a profound
shift in the DPRK's policy. But clearly Moscow was discomfited
that a crisis in whose resolution it had a vital and traditional
geopolitical stake was being conducted without its input. During
February-March 1994, when Russia made its original proposal for
the conference, its relative absence from the Asian agenda did
not go unnoticed. As Izvestiya's Tokyo correspondent, Sergei
Agafonov indicated, nobody actually approved Russia's proposal or
seemed to want its participation. Washington, following its
general underestimation of Russian prospects in Asia, placed its
emphasis on securing South Korean, Chinese, and Japanese
cooperation versus the DPRK.57 And South Korean President Kim
Young Sam said as much to his Parliament. Agafonov stated that
this was inevitable because recently Russia has become an
"outsider" to Asia. He attacked Mikhail Gorbachev's "none too
wise" unilateral move to recognize South Korea as creating a
situation where Moscow has no leverage on its other partners in
Asia. Moscow, he wrote, still had no coherent concept for Asia
and was economically irrelevant to it except for arms sales.58
These criticisms also reflected the complaints of many to
the right and in the military concerning Russia's Asian policy
and they clearly stung. Thus Moscow redoubled the public drive to
get its proposal on the table and head off the U.S. led pressure
on the North, and sanctions supported by the other states cited
above, without Russian participation. As broadcast by the MFA,
the proposal for a 10 power conference expressed support for UN
resolutions in the Security Council that the DPRK meet its
commitments to the IAEA for open inspection. The MFA also stated
that Russia will seek decisive action by the Security Council in
other cases of threatened nuclear proliferation "without double
standards." The MFA also intends to promote a comprehensive
solution to the crisis involving an agenda that,
Must make it possible to reach comprehensive solutions
that take account of the legitimate interests of all

the parties involved. In particular, subjects for
discussion and agreement could be security guarantees
for the DPRK and the ROK, assistance for the process of
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with
international guarantees of its non-nuclear status,
including appropriate international verification, and
guarantees of noninterference in the internal affairs
of the DPRK and ROK.59
Two weeks later, on April 8 1994, Panov observed that the
United States had sidestepped accepting or rejecting the proposal
by saying such a conference must be well prepared. He supported
the U.S. position that the DPRK must fully and unconditionally
return to the NPT and accept IAEA inspection, which would be
accompanied by or constitute denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula (since U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear forces were
removed in 1991). But Russia, he said, also felt that a guarantee
to the North that ensures Korean denuclearization, both Korean
states' sovereignty, and nonintervention in their internal
affairs should be part of the agenda.60 Panov also qualified his
earlier statement that Russia would adhere to the 1961 treaty if
an unprovoked attack on the North occurred, saying that Moscow
would judge whether or not any such attack was unprovoked and
operate under its own constitutional and legal procedures.61
Nonetheless, the hint to Pyongyang doubtless played a part in the
recent mellowing of its relations with Russia.
Meanwhile, no state has accepted that this conference
should take place with Russia's proposed agenda. As an ROK
official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed, such a
proposal can only further extend the process and make the
negotiations still more unwieldy. Moscow can probably regain some
influence in the DPRK through this proposal, but neither Beijing
nor Seoul accept that state of affairs and they still are wary
concerning Russia's ultimate Asian ambitions.62
Thus Moscow's main proposal for this conference, just like
its similar proposal for a conference on the Israel-Arab
conflict, aims mainly to convince itself and others that Russia
is still taken seriously in Asia. But its international
implications are no less unsettling. Kozyrev has stated that
Moscow will not support sanctions upon which it has not been
previously consulted. In view of the domestic opposition to
sanctions which hurt Russian trade with the North and, if they
mean war, bring that war to Russia's borders, support for
sanctions was unlikely. This was the case even before
Ex-President Carter's mission to Pyongyang which has led to a
freeze in the North's nuclear program, preparations for an all
Korean summit, and a resumption of the U.S. negotiations with the
North in July 1994. The Carter mission's accomplishments make
sanctions, or Russian support for an exclusively U.S. initiative,
even more unlikely. Even if both sets of talks break down, Russia
will hardly agree to sanctions without support for its conference
proposal due to the domestic opposition to any U.S. initiatives

and due to its own conflicted posture in Asia that ultimately
aims at diminishing the U.S. alliance system and military
presence there.63
Nor is it clear that the United States should support
Russia's proposal. Animating it is an effort to achieve goals
that are to some degree tangential to and even unrelated to the
issues at hand. Second, it would, at best, impose further delay
which is only in the North's interest. Third, Russia and Japan
have no common basis upon which to build a solution here other
than a preference for a divided and nonnuclear Korea. That
slender common interest provides no basis for those two states to
cooperate or for the United States to cooperate with Russia.
Clearly, Japan strongly opposes the conference proposal.64
Furthermore, given present conditions, Russia will probably line
up behind China which has a more immediate and vital interest in
Korean issues. This will make it a supporter to some degree of
North Korea's position, a fact that can only impede progress in
this conference. For these reasons we must conclude that the
Russian initiative is largely driven by interests opposed to the
U.S. Asian position and represents a Trojan horse for Tokyo,
Washington, and Seoul.
Conclusions.
The sudden death, on July 8, 1994, of Kim-Il Sung, North
Korea's dictator, has not yet (as of September 1994) altered the
situation on the ground with respect to Russia. Though Kim's
death held up bilateral DPRK-U.S. negotiations for a month, they
have resumed and appear to be a serious dialogue. In Russia, if
anything, these events have reinforced both the sense of domestic
struggle over foreign policy and interest in the 10 power
conference. Foreign Minister Kozyrev publicized the struggle
raging over foreign policy by denouncing parliamentarians who he
claimed were supporting the DPRK. He reiterated his belief that
if the bilateral talks break down, there will be no alternative
but Russia's plan, despite other states' coolness to the idea.65
Nonetheless, Russia's current policy represents a
significant backtracking from its earlier policies in 1991-93. At
that time Yeltsin and his emissaries talked publicly of
unilaterally abandoning the 1961 treaty with Pyongyang. Now they
talk of renegotiating an altered treaty. The same holds true, as
we see above, for arms sales to North Korea.66 While efforts to
upgrade ROK-Russia collaboration in military technology and arms
trade for debt have significantly failed, leaving behind
considerable disillusionment in South Korea, Russian interest in
selling arms to the North is both overtly expressed and gaining
in the government.67 This shift in policy reflects the victory of
those favoring the military point of view and the interests of
the military-industrial complex that seeks markets abroad to
survive, whatever the policy implications of that decision may
be. Thus current trends in Russian policy on Korea constitute an

important part of the ascendancy of military-strategic
considerations above all else in overall Asian policy.68
It is not surprising that Russian policy is self-serving,
ambiguous, conflicted, and even possibly deceptive, if not
deceitful, given newly publicized intelligence reports. That is
in the nature of things given current Russian conditions and
represents, in itself, little advance from past Soviet proposals
for regional arms control and security.69 But Russia's posture on
this issue is also profoundly significant for what it portends
regarding general issues in Asian security.
In the absence of strong regional or subregional systems and
where states manifest an asymmetry of interest, multilateral
security discussions, let alone regimes, prove to be very
difficult to construct. The current Korean crisis is only the
most intense instance of this truth. As Edward Olsen and David
Winterford have written,
The Asia-Pacific region confronts the problem of
simultaneously creating a multilateral security system
and building a compatible arms control system. Vastly
complicating this situation is the prospect that there
will not be one of each, but that the sub-regions will
spawn separate versions of each system. The linkages
between them (if any) are problematical.70
Russia's example shows that on top of these problems,
individual states will continue pushing self-serving and
incompatible objectives for both arms control and overall
regional regimes, thereby further complicating efforts by the
United States and its allies to work constructively for
multilateral security in subregions, regions, or across the
region.
A second consequence of this ascendancy of the military
factor in Russian policy is that it encourages the tendency for
Russia to go beyond friendship with China, which is universally
supported in Russia, to actual alliance on the basis of an
ideological anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism and on the basis
of a search for geopolitical revenge that far transcends sound
Realpolitik.71 That alliance also encourages those in China,
e.g., the authors of the book, Can China's Armed Forces Win the
Next War?, who clearly articulate the opinion of or policy
preferences of key elite constituencies there. They argue that
the most significant factor in the expected Sino-U.S.
confrontation is the attitude of the Russian armed forces.72
Should a Sino-Russian alliance come about, it would fundamentally
derail efforts toward a broader strategic stability in Asia, not
just in Korea, but very probably in the South China Sea area, the
center of Chinese attention.
In other words, Russia's Korean policy is important for what
it tells us about trends at home towards demilitarizing past

policy and achieving successful reform throughout Russia and in
the central Far Eastern regions. It is also, of course, important
as a sign of Russia's willingness to rejoin Asia on a new basis
and contribute to peace and security for everyone's benefit. On
the basis of what is now transpiring in Russia's Korean and Asian
policy, it will become more difficult to create a Russia that can
contribute in a positive way to Asian security and stability and
an Asia that can welcome a reformed Russia into its midst.
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